




THE maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad ecelum, et ad inferoe
expresses the interest which a fee-simple owner has in land. He
owns everything contained between lines drawn from the centre of
the earth through the boundaries of his surface property, and pro-
duced to infinity. Theoretically, he has a right in the one direction,
to erect a structure reaching the heavens; or, in the other, to
excavate to the lowest depths.
In order, however, to the proper enjoyment of these rights, it is
necessary that there be a mutual yielding of interest,; the theoret-
ical must be modified by the practical. This common consent is
embodied in the familiar maxim sic utere tuo, ut alienum non kcedas.
The meaning of this would seem to be that the absolute ownership
of property is qualified in its use.
A consideration of the subject of SUPPORT, Lateral and Sub-
jacent, will furnish an illustration of the conflict between the two
common-law maxims.
L LATERAL SUPPOT.-The obvious distinction between the soil
in its natural state and the soil whose weight is increased by artificial
means, suggests the most appropriate division of the subject.
(a) The Natural Soil.-It is a well settled principle of law, that
the owner of land in its natural state, has a right to have it sup-
ported by his neighbor's soil.
The Code of Solon recognised this principle, as may be seen
from the quotation, "If a man dig a sepulchre, or a ditch. he shall
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leave (between it and his neighbor's land), a space equal to its
depth; if he dig a well, he shall leave the space of a fathom."
This enactment was, in substance embodied into the Roman Law
of the Twelve Tables, and thence transferred to the Pandects of
Justinian: Digest X., b. 16, tit. I., § 13.
The doctrine has prevailed from the earliest times, in the Eng-
lish law. It is well formulated by Rolle, in the case of Wilde v.
Minsterley, Rolle Abr. "Tresp)ass," I., pl. 1. "It seems that a
man who has land closely adjoining my land, cannot dig his 1a .1
so near mine, that mine would fall into his pit, and an action
brought for such an act would lie." The later English decisions
uniformly recognise the law as laid down by Rolle, and the consid-
eration of a very few cases, will show how closely the American
law has followed the English.
A very important case, and one always cited when the subject is
discussed, is that of Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220. PAR-
KER, C. J., in the course of his opinion, remarks: "A man,
in digging upon his own land, is to have regard to the position of
his neighbor's land, and the probable consequences to his neighbor,
if he digs too near his line ; and if he disturbs the natural state of
the soil, he shall answer in damages."
The case of Parrand v. .3farshall, 18 Barb. 380, sustains the
law as stated in the above case, that the right to natural support is
incident to property.
Chancellor WALWORTH, in delivering the opinion in Lasala v.
.folbrook, 4 Paige 169, says, "I have a natural right to the use of
my land, in the situation in which it was placed by nature, sur
rounded and protected by the soil of the adjacent lots. And the
owners of those lots will not be permitted to destroy my land, by
removing this natural support, or barrier."
The Pennsylvania case bearing most directly on the subject, is
that of Altvater v. Woods, 1W. N. C. 23 (Pa.). Altvater, the defend-
ant below, undertook to reduce his lot to the grade of the street,
in the city of Allegheny, and as a consequence, the soil of the
plaintiff's lot fell into the excavation. The court, in charging the
jury, allowed the defendant the right to excavate his own ground;
but held that if he could not excavate without injury to his neigh-
bor's natural soil, he was to be entirely deprived of his right.
The doctrine was also applied in Bell et al. v. Reed, 31 Leg. Int.
389 (Pa.), where the complainant brought a bill in equity to restrain
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the respondents from excavating so near complainant's land as to
deprive it of its natural support. The court, in accordance with
the Master's report, awarded a perpetual injunction, restraining the
respondents from excavating within forty feet of complainant's
land. On appeal the injunction was so modified as to allow the
appellants to strip their land up to the appellee's line, "provided
they furnish a sufficient artificial support for appellee's land."
This modification calls attention to another very important prin-
ciple, and one which is recognised in other than Pennsylvania
cases': Thurston v. Hancock, Lasala v. Holbrook, 8upra; Bad-
cliff v. Tftayor, &c., 4 Comst. 195.
In our zeal for establishing and protecting the right of lateral
support, which a man has in his neighbor's soil, there is danger of
our overlooking the fact that the neighbor also has rights which
are to be respected. His land may be of such a quality as to be
useful or valuable only by being excavated and disposed of; as in
the very common cases of sand-pits and stone quarries. Yet, if
the principle under consideration is applied in its full force, he will
be prevented from gaining as much profit from his land as he should
gain. Hence, the wisdom of the rule or permission in Bell v. Reed,
allowing the appellants to support their neighbor's soil artificially,
and thus to receive the full benefit of their own soil. But it would
seem that, notwithstanding any care or skill on the part of the
defendant, still, if the plaintiff's soil falls in as a consequence of
the excavation, the defendant is liable for all damages: Hayes v.
Cohoes Co., 2 Comst. 162.
The majority of the cases considered arose with reference to
land burdened with buildings. But in them all the doctrine of
lateral support to the natural soil is impliedly admitted, if not
expressly stated to be the law. The principle, originating in an
antiquity, preserved in the civil and the common-law system, is
well recognised in the law of to-day.
(6) The Soil Burdened.-As to the right of support which
adjoining landowners have to each other's soil, there is a manifest
distinction to be drawn between lands as left by nature and land
whose weight is increased by artificial means. While it is plainly
in accordance with law and justice that I should have undisturbed
enjoyment of my land, it is not so clearly lawful or just that I
should increase the weight of my land, and call upon my neighbor
not to disturb my newly-acquired right, if a right it be. As we
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have before seen, the neighbor has as much right to his soil as I
have to mine; and consequently he may dig it up and carry it
away, provided he does not injure my natural soil in so doing.
In preventing him from excavating, lest he undermine my build-
ing, I would be committing a positive wrong, that is, would be
depriving him of a natural right.
Lord TENTERDEN, in delivering the opinion of the court in
Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 B. & Ad. 871, after referring to the right
of action for damages occasioned to the natural soil by excavation,
remarks: "But if I have laid an additional weight upon my land,
it does not follow that he (my neighbor) is to be deprived of the
right of digging his own ground because mine will then become
incapable of supporting the artificial weight which I have laid upon
it." The same view is held in Thurston v. hancock, 12 Mass. 220,
and in Lasala v. Eolbrook, 4 Paige 169, in which latter case the
chancellor, after speaking of the neighbor's right to dig upon his
own land, says: "I cannot, therefore, deprive him of this right by
erecting a building on my lot, the weight of which will cause my
land to fall into the pit which he may dig, in the proper and legiti-
mate exercise of his previous right to improve his own lot." The
foregoing authorities are sufficient to establish the general rule, that
a landowner has no natural right to increase the lateral pressure of
his soil, or to add to his neighbor's obligation of natural support.
But as buildings of some kind are necessary to the comfort and con-
venience of landowners, and since they have no natural right to the
support of the adjacent soil, it is obvious that there must be some
artificial right-established either by usage or law.
Easements are acquired by grant, express or implied, or by pre-
scription presuming a grant. A grant of an easement may be im-
plied from certain peculiar circumstances attending the transfer of
land. It has been held in several cases, for instance, that where the
owner of two lots of ground conveys one of them upon which a
house is standing, lie cannot excavate so as to affect the house
because an implied right of support has passed with it: MeGuire
v. Grant, 1 Dutcher 356; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn.
492. Another case extends the owner's disability to his assigns:
-Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige 169. It has been held that where
an owner divides his estate by the alienation of a part, the alienee
becomes entitled to all the continuous and apparent easements:
Keiffer v. Imhoff, 2 Casey 438 (Pa.). But while the easement of
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support to buildings may be continuous, it is not apparent. Hence,
in accordance with the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius est,
it follows that, under the last case, such an easement does not pass
by an implied grant on the division of an estate.
Easements may also be acquired by prescription presuming a
grant. The common lawyers, from the earliest times, manifested a
certain reverence for whatever was ancient. Back to a time whereof
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, was, with them,
a favorite expression. It was owing to this tendency that houses,
ancient or upon ancient foundations, obtained an advantage over
those newly erected. Ancient buildings were such as had, by lapse
of time, gained a right to support by prescription; this right being
more properly an easement, while the right to lateral support of
land by land, is rather an incident of property than an easement:
Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739.
The reasoning was similar to that regarding the acquirement of
land, under the Statutes of Limitations : that as the mere posses-
sion of land ripens, by lapse of time, into an indefeasible title; so,
the right of support to buildings, originally no right at all, becomes
one by the length of time during which it has remained undisturbed.
The doctrine of the common law is, in short, that the easement of
support to artificially weighted land, may be acquired by prescrip-
tion presuming a grant, as well as by a grant itself. The principle
is well illustrated by Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Stansell v. Jollard,
1 Selw. N. P. 444. His language is: "Where a man has built to
the extremity of his soil, and has enjoyed his building above
twenty years, upon analogy to the rule as to lights, he has acquired
a right to a support, or, as it were, of leaning to his neighbor's
soil, so that his neighbor cannot dig so near as to remove the
support; but it is otherwise of a house newly built."
The common-law doctrine as to prescriptive support is followed
in a number of American cases: Tkurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass.
220; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige 169. But see Gilmore v. Dri8-
coil, 122 Mass. 207.
In Pennsylvania, however, we find a different rule prevailing.
We will adopt the analogy suggested above by Lord ELLENBOROUGII,
and consider first, the Pennsylvania law as to "Ancient Lights,"
and from that may be inferred the law as to the easement of sup-
port by prescription.
In Haverstick v. Sipe, 9 Casey 371 (Pa.), LowRiE, C. J.,
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remarks. "It has never been considered in this state that a con
tract for the privilege of light and air over another man's ground
could be implied from the fact that such a privilege has been long
enjoyed," and the reason he gives for this is, that "the advantage
which one man derives by obtaining light and air over the ground
of another is no adverse privilege." In Bichart v. Scott, 7 Watts
460 (Pa.), remarking on the claim of the plaintiff to an implied
consent to the support of buildings, and admitting that an ease-
ment may be acquired by adverse enjoyment and acquiescence for
twenty-one years, KENNEDY, J., says: "But it is difficult, if not
impossible to conceive, how an implication or presumption of such
license or grant can be made, where there is no adverse user,
encroachment upon or possession had or taken of any right or thing
belonging to another, and nothing done to which any other can
make even the slightest color of objection."
Thus it may be seen that one of the essentials to an easement by
prescription is an adverse user during a certain period. Hence, it
being shown that neither the user of light over, nor of support to
buildings from another's ground, can be called adverse, or under a
claim of right, it follows that neither right can be established or
maintained in Pennsylvania. So far as the law of Pennsylvania
is concerned, I am inclined to regard the privilege of support as
belonging to that class of easements which are created by express
grant only.
Of the two doctrines considered, that of the Pennsylvania courts
is clearly the more logical and philosophical. Yet what was long
assured as the common-law doctrine as to prescriptive support, has,
as we have seen, obtained in England and a number of the United
States. We may understand the law of Stansell v. Jollard to have
remained in full force in the English courts up to December 11th
1877, when it was entirely overruled and swept out of existence
by a majority judgment of the Queen's Bench, delivered on that
date.
The case of Angus v. -Dalton, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div. 85; 17
Am. Law Reg. Nt'. S. 645; is one of importance, as its mani-
fest tendency is entirely to change the current of the English
decisions on the subject of prescriptive support. It was an action
brought against defendants for so excavating, as not to leave suffi-
cient lateral support for plaintiff's factory. Plaintiffs had enjoyed
the support of the neighboring house and soil for twenty-seven
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years. The majority opinion of the court was delivered by CocK-
BURN, C. J. ('MELLOR, J., assenting, LusH, J., dissenting). His
argument is, I think, contained in substance, in the following com-
prehensive sentence: "To say that by reason of an adjoining house
being built on the extremity of the owner's soil, a right of support
is to be acquired in the absence of any grant or assent, express or
implied, against the adjacent owner, who may be altogether igno-
rant whether the house or other building is supported by his soil or
not, and who, whether he knows it or not, his no means of resist-
ing the acquisition of an easement against himself, either by dissent
or resistance of any kind, appears to me to be repugnant to reason
and common sense, as well as to the first principles of justice and
right." It is not difficult to perceive the similarity between the
above reasoning and that of KENNEDY, J., forty years earlier, in
Richart v. Scott, before cited. Adverse user and acquiescence are
correlated, and the two together are essential to the establishment
of an easement by prescription. Uninterrupted user amounts to
acquiescence. But where nothing is done to which objection can
be made, there can be no adverse, no interrupted user, and conse-
quently no acquiescence. It is not a little remarkable that after
the lapse of so long a time the doctrine early established in Penn-
sylvania, and looked upon as a peculiarity of the law of that state,
should be adopted by the Court of Queen's Bench as the correct
exposition of the common law.
Now, while I may not have the right by merely increasing the
weight of my property to prevent my neighbor from using his in a
reasonable way, still it is manifest that I have a right to protection
from the consequences of his careless or malicious acts. In other
words, a man must do neither intentional injury, nor what, through
negligence, may amount to injury to his neighbor.
This principle is clearly laid down in the books. In Dodd v.
Hohne, 1 A. & E. 493, Lord DENMAN, C. J., says, inter alia, "A
man has no right to accelerate the fall of his neighbor's house."
The opinions of TAUNTON and WILLIAMS, JJ., are to the effect that
defendants should not have been negligent so as to have injured a
house, which from its own weakness would have soon fallen down.
The principle is here very strictly applied, but it is admitted in
the syllabus, that the jury, on the question of negligence, may con-
sider the state of the plaintiff's house.
Woovworaii, J., in Panton v. .Holland, 17 Johns. 92, remarks;
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"On reviewing the cases, I am of opinion that to man is answera-
ble in damages for the reasonable exercise of a right, when it is
accompanied by a cautious regard for the rights of others; when
there is no just ground for the charge of negligence or uskilfulness,
and when the act is not done maliciously; " and he quotes Baron
CoMYNs to the same effect.
In Bentz v. Armstrong, 8 W.'& S. 40 (Pa.), KENNEDY, J., after
speaking of the necessary improvements to be made on town or city
lots, and the consequent change in the soil, enjoins upon the pur-
chaser, while using his lot for the purpose for which it was bought,
"not to produce any detriment or injury to his neighbor in the occu-
pation or enjoyment of his adjoining lot."
It must be remembered, however, that while the neighbor is to
use due care and diligence, his liability exists, or does not exist,
according to the proper or improper construction of the neighboring
house. This is clearly the law as laid down in ichart v. Scott, 7
Watts 460 (Pa.). KENNEDY, J., says, in that case, "Every builder
ought, in putting up his house, to do it in such a manner as to impose
no unnecessary expense or burthen thereafter upon the owner of the
adjacent lot, when he shall come to build upon it, or to'alter and
remodel that which he may have put on it previously."
II. SUBJACENT SUPPORT.-Land may be divided horizontally as
well as perpendicularly. The surface of the earth is cut up into
sections of square feet, square acres, and square miles. So may its
mass be divided into an infinite number of strata. Each stratum
may, equally with each acre, have a fee-simple owner. Just as a
surface-owner may demand support from an adjacent neighbor, so
may he, or any upper owner, demand support from a subjacent
neighbor. Both rights result from the contiguity of two freeholds.
There is the same distinction between the natural and the bur-
dened soil. As to the rights of support to the natural soil, Lord
CAMPBELL, C. J., (Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739), shows a
perfect similarity. After speaking of the right to lateral support
as a "right of property passing with the soil," and hence, requir-
ing no grant, he continues: "Pari ratione where there are
separate freeholds from the surface of the land and the minerals
belonging to different owners, we are of opinion that the owner of
the surface, while in its natural state, is entitled to have it supported
by the subjacent mineral strata."
The case of HumTphries v. Brogden, 8upra, in which the above
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opinion was delivered, was decided in 1850. There are several
other cases (Harris v. .yding, 5 M. & W. 60; Howbotham v.
Wilson, 8 11. L. 348; Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 Id. 511,) on the
subject, both prior and subsequent to that date, in which a similar
view to that of the Chief Justice is held, and it is law in Pennsyl-
vania: Jones v. Wagner, 16 P. F. Smith 434.
We are not to infer, however, from the language of Lord CAMP
BELL, that the subjacent owner is to be entirely deprived of his right
to mine. To prevent any such conclusion, .he himself remarks fur-
ther on in his opinion: "Those strata may, of course, be removed
by the owner of them, so that a sufficient support for the surface is
left."
This is nothing more than a principle of common sense and justice.
A man of the least mental capacity would hesitate in buying a
mine were he aware that he would not be allowed to excavate it.
He may undoubtedly put the mine to the use for which it was
bought; but he must understand this use to be reasonable. It is
his duty to furnish a reasonable support to the surface (Har-
ris v. Byding, 5 M. & W. 60,), which is "a support that will
protect the surface from subsidence, and keep it securely at its
ancient and natural level :" Hfumphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739.
Anything short of this, even in the absence of negligence, will
render the lower owner liable for all damages.
This is the normal relation existing between the upper and lower
owners of land. But this, of course, may vary according to circum-
stances; as where the surface-owner, originally holding all the land,
has conveyed an estate in the minerals, and by the deed of convey-
ance the usual mining rights are enlarged. It was held, for instance,
in Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. 348, that the rights of the
grantee of minerals depend on the terms of the deed by which they
are conveyed. A much stronger case on this point is Smart v.
Morton, 5 E. & B. 30, the language of which is: "Upon the sev-
erance of the surface and the minerals, a deed might be framed
empowering the owner of the minerals to remove the whole of them
without leaving a support for the surface: compensation being made
to the owner of the surface for the damage thereby occasionid to
his tenement."
Strong as this is, in favor of the grantee, I do not suppose that
in case of gross negligence, he would be free from liability.
As to the soil burdened, there is no more natural right to sub-
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jacent than to lateral support. The right may be acquired 2t
common law, by grant or prescription. The right by prescription
is recognised in Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220, and Lord
CAMPBELL, (Rumnphries v. Brogden, supra), though admitting the
difficulty of finding whence the grant of such an easement can be
presumed, yet, illogical as it may seem, holds that a right to lateral
support may be acquired in this manner (referring to the language
of Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Stansell v. Jollard, 1 Selw. N. P. 444,
as an authority for his position), and extends the application of the
principle, by analogy, to subjacent support. The principle is
adhered to in Bogers v. Taylor, 2 Hurlst. & IN. 828, with the
query in addition-whether independently of prescription, the
owner of the surface has not a right to the vertical support of the
subjacent strata, for the surface and for all reasonable buildings
put upon it.
The whole duty of the subjacent owners may be summed up
in the one expression "reasonable use ;" which means that he must
work his mines in a manner not materially to injure the surface.
When such injury does occur, there is a presumption of negligence
on the part of the subjacent owner. If negligence be shown, it
matters not whether a house be ancient or modern, the one com-
mitting the wrong will be liable. Where a lower owner is working
his mine so carelessly that if he continues, injury to the surface will
ensue, he may, on complaint, be restrained by a court of equity :"
-Lawrence, Herkle J Co.'s Appeal, 2 W. N. C. 4 (Pa.). As to
the question of negligence there are correlative rights and duties.
Caldwell v. Fulton, 7 Casey 481, and Jones v. Wagner, 16 P. F.
Smith 434, substantiate this statement. They are to the effect that
the upper and under ground estates are governed as other estates,
by the maxim sic utere tuo, ut alienum non lcedas. The upper
freeholder is entitled to reasonable support from the lower, 
while
the lower is, in turn, not to be unreasonably deprived of his accus-
tomed rights.
To sum up the entire subject of support, lateral and subjacent,
it may be said, that the right to natural support is universally 
held
as law; that the right of support to burdened soil is not a 
right
naturally, but one to be acquired at common law by 
grant, express
or implied, or (as formerly with reference to lateral 
support and
still with reference to subjacent support) by prescription; 
by the
Pennsylvania law, to be acquired, if at all, by express grant only.
